Introduction
Intractable disputes are characterised by multi-layered accusations and counter-accusations and involve situations where history, politics and law conspire to render an already complicated situation impenetrable to weaker mechanisms of collective security. In addition, as a result of the various interests of the five permanent members of the Security Council, most such disputes are beyond the reach of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Long running disputes, for example, between Israel and Palestine over the Occupied Territories, India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Cyprus and Turkey over Northern Cyprus, the US and Cuba over unremediated confiscations of US property following the seizure of power by Fidel Castro in 1959 and the subsequent imposition of an embargo by the US, US and Iran over the latter's nuclear ambitions, the sovereignty disputes over the Falklands/Malvinas between the UK and Argentina and over Gibraltar between the UK and Spain, remain unresolved and seemingly insoluble.
This chapter attempts to explore dispute settlement in this barren landscape where it seems that the politics of opposition, in which states not only oppose each other but, after a time, often oppose a solution to the dispute, outweigh the restoration of normal relations between states based on basic principles of international law. The chapter treads a precarious path between two extremes to dispute settlement, one based more-or-less on politics and one based on applying legal rules, neither of which provide evidence of success. At one end we have settlement by means of power politics in its various manifestations, which may or may not involve the use of measures authorised by the Security Council * I would like to thank Marc Wesley and Lydia Davies-Bright for their research assistance on this chapter.
understandings of the principles of international law, 5 as well as alternative mechanisms for dispute settlement, are considered by the parties, if agreement is to be achieved. There is no magic formula that will solve the dispute and, it is submitted, that it is a mistake to consider that international law works in such a manner.
This chapter places dispute settlement broadly within Martii Koskenniemi's indeterminacy thesis, and then adapts his idea of international law as the 'gentle civilizer of nations', which he posited generally in the form of a question: 'between the arrogance of universality and the indifferences of particularity, what else is there apart from the civilized manner of gentle spirits?'. 6 After outlining Koskenniemi's analysis of how law can play a role in relation to collective security, this chapter applies such thinking to bilateral disputes. In so doing, it shows that such disputes are not resolved by the 'indifferences of particularity' but, drawing on Koskenniemi's idea, it argues that when the political regime encasing the dispute collapses, or radically changes, law can play a crucial role in establishing a new political regime based on the normalisation of relations.
Such a normalisation of relations is not only based on applicable principles of international law, but also on underpinning values of peace, justice and reconciliation. These values find current expression, for example, within modern ideas of transitional justice, a regime that has emerged most strongly within the context of post-conflict rebuilding. Transitional justice is based on the premise that without both a reckoning (as regards past abuses) as well as a reconciliation (between groups and individuals on different sides of the conflict), the underlying cycle of violence will only be broken temporarily.
Clearly, there is a tension between reckoning and reconciliation so that often a peace process contains forms of compromise between the two, such as conditioned amnesties and alternative forms of accountability. 7 Thus, in bilateral disputes, characterised by regular outbreaks of armed conflict (over Kashmir in 1949 Kashmir in , 1965 Kashmir in and 1971 ; in the Middle East, principally in 1948 East, principally in , 1956 East, principally in , 1967 East, principally in and 1973 against Cuba in the Bay of Pigs in 1961; over Cyprus with the Turkish intervention in 1974; and over the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982), the levels of hostility between the two countries have been such that, before normal relations can be established, a post-dispute (or post-confrontation) phase has to be navigated by the parties. Transitional justice and related arguments for a jus post bellum, 8 although not directly applicable to disputes between states, serve to illustrate that international law has the potential to facilitate a dynamic environment in which both peace and justice can be built.
Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that the values most prominently found in transitional justice are also actually located, but buried more deeply, in the more orthodox and traditional methods of dispute settlement between states.
The chapter is structured as follows: first it considers the place of law in the politics of settlement, drawing on Martii Koskenniemi's analysis of the indeterminacy of international law, and how, despite that, international law still has relevance, not only as a 'gentle civilizer' in times of relative stability, but as an important form of stability in times of change. The chapter then moves on to consider how this applies within a bilateral dispute where the principles of reciprocity and restoration, which are shown to be interlaced in the structures of international law, help to ensure that the bilateral situation moves from the politics of confrontation, towards the politics of normalisation; in other words, from a situation that violates international law and threatens international relations, towards one that is in conformity with international law and restores a condition of peaceful co-existence between states.
The chapter also considers how diplomacy can lead to finding common legal ground, enabling the parties to achieve relative certainty within a system of primary and secondary rules of international law characterised by indeterminacy. The chapter goes on to demonstrate that this understanding of international law is compatible with traditional political (non-judicial) methods of dispute settlement, which are based on reciprocity and restoration, and that it is helpful, but not necessary, to use analogies with transitional justice to make this point.
Place of law in the politics of settlement
Law, at any level, whether national, regional or international, is a product of politics, but law is also expected to provide a normative framework within which political discretion should be exercised so that the political system is subject to the rule of law. In international relations, however, given the continuing dominance of sovereign states, it is more difficult to maintain that there exists an international rule of law, despite UN rhetoric to that effect. 9 The deeper reason for this is clearly exposed by the critical methodology of Martti Koskenniemi, who wrote in 1990, against the backdrop 9 See, for example, UN Doc A/RES/68/116 (2013): 'The rule of law at the national and international levels', which, at para 4, 'reaffirms the imperative of upholding and promoting the rule of law at the international level in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations'.
of a claimed new world order emerging in the radically changed circumstances at the end of the Cold War, that:
Our inherited ideal of a World Order based on the Rule of Law thinly hides from sight the fact that social conflict must still be solved by political means and that even though there may exist a common legal rhetoric among international lawyers, that rhetoric must, for reasons internal to the ideal itself, rely on essentially contested -political -principles to justify outcomes to international disputes.
10
The internal problem faced by international law is that the law, especially custom, is generated by state practice and so can be seen either as an excuse or an apology for state behaviour. Any attempt to depart from state practice can be dismissed as utopian and, therefore, irrelevant in that it will have no impact upon state behaviour. In order to achieve universal agreements in more formal documents, treaties or resolutions, norms are crafted in abstract and indeterminate terms. Thus, in these conditions:
Behind ritualistic references to well-known rules and principles of international law (the content of which remains a constant object of dispute), legal practice has increasingly resorted to resolving disputes by a contextual criterion -an effort towards an equitable balance. Though this has seemed to work well, the question arises as to whether such practice can be adequately explained in terms of the Rule of Law.
11
In this way, law forms part of the debate and discussion within which disputes can be resolved but, in the end, abstract, disputed and often indeterminate universal rules can only provide guides towards an equitable solution that is politically just. 12 The growth, since 1990, of specialist international legal regimes, with greater precision in terms of rules, does not remove political choices, 13 given that disputes refuse to neatly fit within only one legal regime. The US-Cuba dispute, for instance, involves issues of forcible and non-forcible measures, sovereignty and self-determination, democratic and socio-economic rights, as well as trade and investment. Resort to human rights norms and mechanisms will produce a different range of answers to ones sought within a trade regime. The problem is exacerbated when the disputants' participation in different regimes does not overlap significantly or even marginally (for example, by not being parties to the same multilateral treaties).
Furthermore, despite problems with indeterminacy, Koskenniemi argues that international laws, can, especially at certain crucial points, have a significant role to play, even within highly politicised regimes 10 M. concerning the security of states. In contrast, realism foresees security being achieved in such circumstances by states acting out of self-interest and, eventually, by achieving a balance of power.
14 Koskenniemi argues that a pure realist approach still contains within its method normative premises involving stylised and abstract understandings of concepts, such as 'interest' (as in the national 'interest'), 'security' (as in national 'security') and 'power' (as in balance of 'power'). In addition, he argues that the legal justifications invariably put forward by states for their actions, under a balance of power or similar system, are not simply excuses but meaningful justifications and explanations for action. 15 In effect, it could be argued that to act both out of self-interest and within the constraints of the law are not mutually exclusive actions given that law influences how self-interest can be pursued. According to Martii Koskenniemi, law also took on a shaping role in the 1990 crisis that followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The end of the Cold War meant that:
The traditional patterns of Council decision making had become irrelevant and inapplicable. There was no anterior political agreement, no longstanding negotiation with fixed positions, and no routine language to cover events. The situation was canvassed nowhere but in the Charter itself. As the debate took on a legal style and an engaged aspect, the rest of formalism followed suit. After the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington of 11 September 2001, in which the world's remaining superpower was significantly wounded by a relatively small non-state terrorist group, the political context changed to a 'war on terror' or, more accurately, an age of terror. Arguably, international law, this time on self-defence, provided a constraint on US reaction within this new political context, but at the same time self-defence was adapted to a new form of threat. However, even after the new self-defence paradigm seemingly became accepted following 9/11, the expansion of the right suffered from abuse in that it was used as a justification for a continuing war of self- threats to its security (and out of a sense of a job unfinished in 1991 and a vague idea that 9/11 and Iraq were related), and not out of a belief in the revival argument as a valid exception to the ban on the use of force, is not a 'rule' in any sense other than that any act of unpunished violence creates an argument that can be wielded against those that insist on a formal application of the law. According to Martii Koskenniemi, arguing that 'normative factors are either irrelevant or only marginally relevant … undermines the degree to which any social action, including international activity, makes constant reference to normative codes, rules, or principles'. 30 Furthermore, 'political events are never simply physical acts or people behaving empirically in this way or that', rather they 'exist in relation to a shared normative code of meaning'.
31
The only rules that emerge from a realist analysis are those as defined by the realist -that power and self-interest explain action. In effect, such an approach replaces one set of foundations (based on jus cogens and other basic principles and purposes of international law) with normative foundations of another kind based on power and self-interest. Real rules are so contingent as to be impossible to formulate in any meaningful sense, resulting in a case-by-case analysis where any lessons learned cannot be put forward as universal rules. Legal principles may be weak in comparison to this reality, but the formal laws remain as constraints, no matter how weak, on power. To conflate power and law is to remove law from having any independent function from power including, arguably, its key function -as a restraint on power.
It may well be very difficult to prove that most states do not use force because of a formal legal principle prohibiting force in the UN Charter, 32 but constant restatement of that principle by organs of the international community, such as the General Assembly, must indicate that the legal principle, despite problems with indeterminacy, is and will be a factor that helps shape state behaviour.
Furthermore, Koskenniemi makes the point that 'Realism's causal modes were dependent upon, or
could not be applied in abstraction from, normative choices regarding desirable courses of action'.
33
The alleged failure of the Security Council to fully adapt to the changed conditions of Iraq in 2003 does not mean that it has been irrelevant since its creation in 1945 when geopolitics were very different.
34
The Council did adapt in 1990. Besides which, it is equally plausible to argue that the Security Council's inability to authorise force in 2003 was because the weight of world opinion was behind the threatened vetoes of France and Russia and not behind the warlike intentions of the US and the UK. 30 Koskenniemi, 'The Place of Law in Collective Security', 468. 31 Ibid. Council from deciding on issues of justice, or at least setting up mechanisms to deliver justice, for example, the ad hoc criminal tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. 40 The Assembly, in contrast, has recently rediscovered its voice as the world slides once again towards great power confrontation following Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. The Assembly called upon states to 'desist and refrain from action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine's borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful means'.
41
What the above analysis shows is that law plays a role in the most hostile of environments concerning collective and national security, where achieving agreement to take collective action against threats to the peace is extremely difficult, even more so when seeking to achieve agreement and take action 35 dealing with particularities, it is contended that his analysis does apply to bilateral disputes so that law, despite its indeterminacy and its general subservience to politics, has relevance. In doing this we are not guilty of reducing international law to particularities, rather we are making the claim that it is, in one sense, easier to make the universalities of international law work within a bilateral context than it is within a collective context where the achievement of inter-subjective agreement is more difficult. 43 This has to be balanced against the fact that in long-running bilateral disputes the levels of disagreement can go much deeper than at the multilateral level.
It follows that for international law to take on a significant shaping role in any process of dispute settlement, there must be a significant break in the prevailing political context. Council 'legislation' prohibiting support for terrorism). 45 Arguably, the end of the Cold War should have been the context-breaking event that led to the end of a number of intractable bilateral disputes, for example, the US-Cuban confrontation, given the removal of Soviet support for Cuba and the opening of the Cuban economy to wider trade. However, the US decision was to continue the same political framework and, indeed, to re-enforce it by tightening the embargo in order to remove one of the few remaining Communist regimes. 46 In effect, in 1991 the Cold War had ended between the superpowers but continued across the Florida Straits. However, it is contended that in bilateral disputes, while the broader international political conditions remain a factor, of more importance is the political relationship between the two states -if this sees a fundamental shift, then international law can operate to stabilise and normalise the relationship.
Bilateral Disputes: Seeking agreement based on reciprocity and restoration
As has been argued, in many bilateral disputes there are instances of uses of force between the states concerned and, although a condition of war may have been relatively brief, the dispute has been one of confrontation or conflict in a broad sense and could not be said to be a state of peace, so that there is a clear need for a process that leads to a peace agreement. In the reality of dispute settlement and negotiation of peace agreements, international norms jockey for influence within a politically unstable context. Indeed, peace agreements in the post-Cold War period have shown a number of similarities to the extent that it has been argued by Christine Bell that what is emerging is a form of lex pacificatoriae. 47 Although most of these agreements are aimed at bringing an end to intra-state conflicts, those common principles identified by Bell are, in the main, also applicable to inter-state disputes.
Common features of peace accords include agreement by the parties on methods of achieving peace and security, self-determination and human rights, transitional justice (to address wrongful acts committed), and on the provision of access to justice. Without such an agreement covering peace and justice between the two disputant states, the cycle of confrontation and conflict will not be broken. Although the majority could draw support for this interpretation from a textual reading of the Article, the minority pointed out that this undermined any reciprocity underpinning the agreement. 64 By disregarding that reciprocity, the Tribunal has provided only one-sided justice and, although that is some justice, it is not one upon which to build reconciliation and restoration between the two countries.
Towards a peace agreement
In the field of complex dispute settlement international law works as part of a political process, rather than as part of a judicial-type process based on the attempted application of rules to provide blackand-white solutions and answers. The indeterminacy at the heart of international law signifies that a purely formalist approach is at worse a deception, at best a genuine, but flawed, attempt at syllogistic reasoning. In contrast, Koskenniemi's 'culture of formalism' is based on a conception of universality that is 'neither a fixed principle nor a process but a horizon of possibility that opens up the particular identities in the very process where they make their claims of identity'.
by political interests and compromises, but it is argued that the most legitimate agreement, and, therefore, those having the best chance of longer-term success emerging from a peace process, are those framed by international law and, indeed, key principles of international law provide the basis for agreement. The International Court of Justice may be a suitable forum for specifically (and narrowly) defined disputes, but it is no match for diplomacy and associated non-judicial methods when complex disputes are being addressed. This does not mean that international law is irrelevant, but what it does mean is that we have to think about international law in terms of revealing a 'horizon of possibilities' for negotiators, in contrast with negotiations that are simply framed by politics, which will result in a 'clash of incommensurate "value systems" none of which can be rationally preferred'. 66 The importance of diplomacy was made clear by the International Court of Justice in a 1980 case concerning US hostages being held in Iran, another facet of the confrontation between the US and Iran. The Court described diplomacy as an 'instrument essential for effective cooperation in the international community, and for enabling states, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means'. 67 Bearing in mind the importance of diplomacy establishing a basis of reciprocity in order to achieve restoration of normal relations between states involved in a bilateral dispute, the chapter now turns to the methods of dispute settlement normally deployed in international law and relations. It will be seen that these methods are a practical application of what Koskenniemi has called the need to achieve an 'equitable balance' in resolving disputes. 68 The whole process of negotiation towards an agreement with reciprocal rights and duties is premised on the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, which is a basic principle of international law as located in the UN Charter. 69 Furthermore, the purposes of the UN Charter prominently include the admonition to 'bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace'. 70 It is that combination of justice and law that facilitates an equitable interpretation and Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which covers the peaceful settlement of disputes, obligates disputant states to 'seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice', before resorting to the Security Council. 72 These methods of settlement are not necessarily mutually exclusive. All settlement processes commence with negotiation and, in relatively confined issues, this may be sufficient to produce agreement. 73 In relation to intractable disputes, an unwillingness by the parties to meet face-to-face, or the lack of progress in 'talks about talks', might lead the parties to allow for third party intervention in the settlement process. At one end of a spectrum third party involvement may simply take the form of 'good offices' or a 'channel for communication', while the other end involves the 'assignment' to the third party or body 'to investigate the dispute and to present the parties with a set of formal proposals for its solution'. The latter is known as 'conciliation', whereas 'mediation' is situated somewhere between good offices and conciliation. 74 The mediator is an 'active participant authorised, and indeed expected, to advance fresh proposals and to interpret as well as transmit, each party's proposals to the other'.
75
Given the historical animosity between the parties in the disputes mentioned at the outset of this chapter, mediation may represent a suitable method rather than to face-to-face negotiations, also bearing in mind that neither government of the disputant states would necessarily want to be faced with a concrete set of proposals for peaceful settlement coming from a conciliation commission.
Mediation accords with the idea of a settlement process that operates within an equitable framework of law and justice, underpinned by reciprocity and aiming for restoration. Ultimately, it is up to both parties to agree on a mediator. John Merrills asks:
What of the mediator's substantive contribution? The aim … must be to satisfy both parties. In some situations it will be possible to do this by giving each state all or most of what it wants. This is because the aims of the parties in an international dispute are rarely identical and often quite different. Of course, the fact that there is a dispute indicates that the parties' aims are not entirely compatible, but unsuccessful negotiations may cause these differences to become the exclusive focus of attention. A mediator who can remind the parties of their essential objectives (or cause them to be redefined) may therefore be in a position to suggest a mutually satisfactory arrangement.
76
Alternatively, or possibly in addition, the parties might be encouraged to agree on another traditional method of inter-state dispute settlement -inquiry. Inquiry involves bringing in a third party or body 72 Disagreements on the fundamental principles of international law represent the core of disputes and, therefore, they inevitably will form the general framework for any dispute settlement process. The aim of any peace process will be for those states involved to achieve common understandings on such principles in the context of the bilateral relationship between them. The genuine consent of the two 77 Orakhelashvili has demonstrated that self-determination is a peremptory norm of international law accepted by the international community as allowing no derogation. 83 However, this has to be placed within the context of the indeterminacy that haunts the principle of self-determination in international law, in both its political and economic aspects, allowing states a significant degree of room to negotiate as to how it will be protected and implemented. As Rein Mullerson points out in relation to another norm of jus cogens -the prohibition on the use of force -while states agree that the prohibition is jus cogens, they are not agreed on its precise content or the content of the exceptions to it. 84 More generally, it has been accurately stated that 'one of the criticisms of jus cogens is that they lack sufficiently robust meaning to provide effective constraints on decision making'. 85 Finding common legal ground involves a recognition that international laws often do not give black and white answers, for example, as to whether sovereignty is absolute or mediated, 86 whether nonintervention covers all forms of interference, whether self-determination is a purely external one-off event or whether it is internal on-going process (and the meaning of this), and whether civil and political rights have priority over socio-economic rights. 87 Such uncertainty signifies that alternative choices can be made by states and a variety of contextual understandings agreed upon. It follows that while legal principles frame discussions, they cannot determine the dispute without common agreement on their meaning and application in the context of the political relationship between the two states, as well as the broader geopolitical context. Drawing upon the works of Jurgen Habermas, establish a 'communicative consensus' about the parties' 'understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their actions'. 89 Parties refer to a common system of norms and rules, 90 with international law supplying the 'rules of the game'. 91 This signifies that 'once international relations are framed in terms of law, they operate within the disciplinary constraints of an interpretive community'. 92 Legal discourse involves 'appeals to legal norms as they are understood not by each actor individually (subjectively) or in some abstract sense (objectively) but together as a collective law-interpreting body (inter-subjectively)'. 93 While powerful states have greater leverage within diplomatic relations, they 'cannot change those rules (and shift the terms of the debate)
instantaneously and at will'. 94 Powerful states have to respect the 'conventions of argument, persuasion and justification associated with the particular enterprise in which the deliberations occur'. 95 However, given the problems of indeterminacy in a number of applicable principles and rules of international law, there is scope for 'divergent legal arguments'. 96 In effect, international law operates as the common language for diplomacy, not as a system of readily applicable rules. This allows the parties to achieve understanding upon which a peaceful solution can be built, building on Koskenniemi's idea that when the political relationship governing two states comes to an end international law operates to fill in the space vacated by politics, but it does not do so by providing a ready solution or answer. Furthermore, while indeterminacy takes away the legs from a purely formalist approach to international law, Koskenniemi's critique reveals that a 'culture of formalism' whereby, 'although every (legal) decision is constitutive, and not just a reproduction of some underlying structure, each decision also acts as a kind of surface on which the horizon of universality becomes visible'. 97 Thus, while 'indeterminacy provides cope for divergent legal arguments', 98 it 'does not render discourse meaningless'. 99 International legal principles applicable to the dispute, indeed often at its heart, must be discussed, interpreted, agreed upon in formal or informal terms and, finally, implemented. If common ground has been successfully captured in that agreement, subsequent political relations can be framed by international law as encapsulated in the agreement.
The flexibility contained within the primary rules of international law, facilitating choice and agreement by the parties to an inter-state dispute, is matched by the secondary rules of international law. Although the 'rules' on state responsibility may appear to be rigid and formal, these rules are constructed in such a way that enable them to be shaped and applied by states in order to facilitate the settlement of disputes between them. All state disputes, and indeed any situation where a state is responsible for breach of the primary rules of international law, are governed by the Articles on State Responsibility of 2001, which, for instance, provide that 'full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination'. 100 The Articles also provide that the 'state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation' and that 'satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality'. 101 The point is that even under the apparently formal rules of state responsibility there is a range of remedies that can be adjusted as appropriate to the dispute under consideration. States involved in a complex dispute, in which both sides have violated international law, may have to concede that remedies will be available against them if settlement is to be achieved.
In this way the secondary rules of responsibility fit the notion that international law provides a framework within which states can settle their disputes. As recognised by Martii Koskenniemi, in the practical world of dispute settlement the 'applicable rules come about through a complex diplomatic play that aims at freedom and constraint simultaneously'.
102
It should be borne in mind that the secondary rules on state responsibility, as found in the ILC's Articles of 2001, should not be seen as a form of international legislation, to be applied by courts and other bodies without regards to practice and context. They are abstract principles that require shaping and re-shaping by states within particular contexts to provide them with tools of international law with which they can normalise their international relations with other states after a rupture between them involving violations of international law. To view the Articles on State Responsibility as an inflexible set of rules would be a mistake. They are not constructed in such a way. The very fact that the ILC's Articles did not take the form of a treaty, but are left as soft laws to be developed by interpretation and application to disputes, implies that they are meant to be adapted and shaped by state practice.
Conclusion
It has been argued in this chapter that the parties to those disputes outlined in the introduction will, at a certain critical point in the future, seize the moment when there is a dramatic break in the political context that has governed their relations, thereby setting off a process of diplomacy whereby the parties, through discussion of general issues and specific mechanisms, move towards a peace agreement in which the parties agree to normalise their diplomatic, political and economic relations over a period of time. The peace process and peace agreement in inter-state disputes is primarily aimed at restoring and normalising peaceful relations between the parties. However, it has been shown in this chapter that the concept of 'restoration' is not just embodied in modern notions of transitional justice, as applied within conflict-ridden states, but is also found within the primary and secondary rules of international law and mechanisms that are applicable to states in their inter-state relations to provide for accountability for breach of those rules.
The indeterminacy of the primary and secondary rules of international law, as unveiled by Martii
Koskenniemi particularly in his earlier work, 103 enables the parties to negotiate a common understanding of them in the context of their dispute and the political conditions between them.
Koskenniemi makes it clear that his characterisation of indeterminacy is not that all international legal terms are 'semantically ambivalent', but is a much stronger claim that 'even where there is no semantic ambivalence whatsoever, international law remains indeterminate because it is based on later works, 106 is properly recognised and allowed to function and flourish within political processes.
Indeed, all of Koskenniemi's work is united by a recognition that international law appears as a rigorous form of formalism while, at the same time, being simultaneously politically open-ended. 107 The key to understanding international law is to resist the 'pull of either excessive "formalism" or excessive policy-oriented "realism"', 108 and to see it primarily 'as a language of justification'. 109 This means that international law is a 'means to articulate particular preferences or positions in a formal fashion', which will reveal the 'possibilities and limits of political contestation through the adoption of a culture of formalism in a particular institutional environment'. 110 Justifications and arguments are made not in the abstract but in relation to concrete cases so that, for example, '"sovereignty" cannot be grasped by examining the "idea of sovereignty" somehow floating autonomously in conceptual space but by studying how that word is invoked in institutional contexts so as to make or oppose particular claims'. 111 For Koskenniemi, this signifies that the 'grammar of sovereignty shifts between assuming the full rights of States (concrete) and their complete submission to a binding law (normative)' and, furthermore, that 'closure is attained by balancing formulas' such as 'reasonable' or 'equitable', or 'simply by agreeing to seek agreement in a local or otherwise situation-specific context'. 112 While this chapter has argued for the profound relevance of such an approach in a bilateral inter-state dispute, it has also adopted the position that any such local agreement coming out of the process will not only embody particularities, but will contain agreement on contested terms of international law such as 'sovereignty' and 'self-determination', meaning that international law can provide the basis for a meeting of the minds. The peace agreement will also include compromises based on the equitable sharing of resources, liabilities and assets. However, those compromises flow from inter-subjective agreement between the parties on disputed legal principles and that, following Northern Ireland). While recognising the deficiencies of these agreements (particularly, though not exclusively, the failure to fully deliver the Palestinians' right to self-determination, the lack of accountability for past atrocities in Northern Ireland, the failure to fully address the embedded nature of inequalities in South Africa, and the paternalistic interventionist nature of Dayton), Bell's conclusion on the role of law in peace agreements is largely in line with the argument and analysis found in this chapter:
As regards international law, while its traditional regulative function may seem particularly susceptible to political vagaries, this observation is not new. However, the facilitative impact of a broad range of soft and hard law standards indicates a greater role for international law than might have been imagined, and a need for international law to rise to the occasion. Politicians agreeing to human rights measures in the heat of negotiations often draw on international standards. Continued evolution of the facilitative function of international law does not necessarily depend upon a hardening of the law, but more on international law remaining creatively connected to notion of 'good practice' and capable of commanding a moral normativity.
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The argument in this chapter is a simple one: that, while acknowledging the indeterminacy of key principles of international law, it is possible to apply the approach Bell outlines to inter-state disputes, even apparently intractable ones, drawing on those strengths underpinning the primary and secondary rules of international law -of mutual respect, peaceful co-existence and reciprocity -to After showing how Koskenniemi's analysis of law can play a role in relation to collective security, this chapter applied such thinking to bilateral disputes. In so doing, the chapter has demonstrated that such disputes will not be resolved by the 'indifferences of particularity' but, drawing on Koskenniemi's ideas, it has shown that when the political regime encasing the dispute collapses, or radically changes, law can and should play a crucial role in establishing a new political regime based on the normalisation of relations.
